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DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ASSUMPTION OF RISK
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
"Attempting to explain with logic the cases on assumption of risk
is almost an impossible task"; the cases seem irreconcilable,1 and many
courts use the terms assumption of risk and contributory negligence
interchangeably.2 The doctrines of assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence overlap when plaintiff has made an unreasonable
choice to assume the risk; consequently many scholars and some courts
believe a merger would be appropriate.3 The majority of courts have
rejected this merger on the ground that assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence are distinguishable when a person reasonably
and voluntarily chooses to encounter a known danger, thus assuming
the risk, yet not being contributorily negligent. 4 This distinction
that a plaintiff may voluntarily, yet reasonably, choose to encounter
a known danger seems highly questionable when the basis for de-
termining voluntary choice is examined.
The problems involved in distinguishing between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence are illustrated in Kelley v. Alexand-
er.5 Plaintiff employed defendant to repair conditions on plaintiff's
property, and, while performing these repairs, defendant left an un-
protected hole in plaintiff's yard. Plaintiff, afraid that the children
who frequently played in her yard might be hurt, was attempting to
drag a limb over the hole when she slipped and fell into the hole.
'Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 Baylor L. Rev. 111 (1964).
'Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959);
Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J. Super. i8o, 89 A.2d 476, 477 (1952); Mudrich v. Standard
Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, go N.E.2d 859, 862 (1950); Ferguson v. .ongsma, xo Utah 2d
179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960).
'Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 15o A.2d 17 (1959); Felgner
v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.V.2d 136, 153 (1965); McGrath v. American
Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-40 (1963).
'E.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 503 (1914); Narramore
v. Cleveland, C.C. 6 St. L. Ry., 96 Fed. 298, 304 (6th Cir. 1899); Porter vt. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 201 Ala. 469, 78 So. 375, 377 (1918); Wescott v. Chicago Great
JV.R.R., 157 Minn. 325, 196 N.V. 272, 273 (1923); Lively v. Chicago, RI. & P. Ry.
115 Kan. 784, 225 Pac. 1o3, 105 (1924). Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Ra-
tionale of Assumption of the Risk, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 323, 335 (1943), Comment,
"Volenti Non Fit Injuria" is Actions of Negligence, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461
(1895).
1392 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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Plaintiff brought suit for her injuries and defendant pleaded contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of the risk. The trial court granted
defendant a summary judgment without elaborating on which defense
the judgment was based. On appeal plaintiff contended that under
the rescue doctrine she was justified in encountering the danger and
thus did not assume the risk.6 The appellate court upheld the sum-
mary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had assumed the risk.
The rescue doctrine was held inapplicable here as justification for as-
suming the risk because there was no evidence of "imniinent peril."7
The lone dissenter based his opinion on two grounds: first, under
previous decisions of the court, the rescue doctrine may have been ap-
plicable in Kelley.8 However, the dissenter did not elaborate on this
point and may have realized that discussion of the rescue doctrine was
irrelevant since the proper effect of the rescue doctrine is to provide
a cause-in-fact connection and a duty relationship between a negli-
gent defendant and a third party rescuer.9 In Kelley, defendant's lia-
"Plaintiff relied on recent dicta that under assumption of the risk the plaintiff
cannot recover if he deliberately and voluntarily encounters a known risk, however,
"there may be some exceptions, such as where the plaintiff is motivated by humani-
tarianism or rescue impulses." Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.V.2d 368,
379 (Tex. 1963).
'The court may have overstepped its powers in deciding that, as a matter of
law, there was no imminent peril. "The word 'imminent' carries the idea of close-
ness in point of time, but does not necessarily imply the absence of any interval
whatever. There is some latitude in its application according to the situation pre-
sented." Smith v. City Ice & Delivery Co., 117 Kan. 485, 232 Pac. 6o3, 605 (1925). "In
determining whether the peril, or appearance of peril, is imminent ... the circum-
stances presented to the rescuer must be such that a reasonable prudent man, under
the same or similar circumstances would determine that such peril existed. (The
issue of whether the rescuer's determination conformed with the reasonably prudent
man standard is a question for the jury, under proper instruction.)" French v. Chase,
48 Wash. 2d 825, 297 P.2d 235, 239 (1956). The fact that no one was in actual
danger and that plaintiff's act might ultimately have proved unnecessary does
not affect the situation. The facts must be viewed as they might reasonably have
appeared to the plaintiff, and there is a "peculiar value" in submitting the issue to
the jury. Cote v. Palmer, 127 Conn. 321, 6 A.2d 595, 599 (194o).
8The dissenter noted that Swift & Co. v. Baldwin, 299 SAV.2d 157 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1957), cited by the Kelley majority, applied the rescue doctrine to a fact sit-
uation similar to the one facing plaintiff in Kelley. In Swift & Co. plaintiff was in-
jured while attempting to repair a loose sign in an area where school children
frequently passed. The jury found there was imminent peril, although there were
no children in the area at the time of plaintiff's act.
'"The effect of the rescue doctrine when properly applied ... is to extend for
the benefit of the rescuer the liability which the defendant in a given case may
have toward the person whom it has placed in danger." Brady v. Chicago 6
Nw.R.R., 265 Wis. 618, 62 N.W.2d 415, 419 (1954). Cardozo stated in the land-
mark case, Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921), "danger
invites rescue" and the defendant cannot claim the rescuer was unforeseeable.
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bility to plaintiff is based on the employment contract relation be-
tween them, and the rescue doctrine is raised by plaintiff to refute
assumption of risk, not to provide the necessary cause-in-fact con-
nection and duty relationship between defendant and plaintiff.
The second ground of dissent was that, regardless of the applica-
bility of the rescue doctrine in Kelley, plaintiff had not assumed the
risk because "one who has a legal right, or is under a social or legal
duty, to act as he has under conditions created by defendant's wrong
does not act voluntarily."'1 The defendant's duty violation imposed
a legal duty on the plaintiff;" thus the plaintiff's choice to encounter
the danger was not the voluntary choice required for assumption of
risk.1
2
What constitutes a voluntary choice has caused most of the con-
fusion between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 3 To
understand that confusion it is necessary to understand in what sense
assumption of risk is being used.14 Assumption of risk has been ana-
lyzed into at least three distinct fact situations. 15 (i) The plaintiff
"Kelley v. Alexander, supra note 5, at 794.
""A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to children tres-
passing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if (a) the place
where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to
kuow that [such] children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of
which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should
realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or seriously bodily harm to such
children, and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condi-
tion or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it...." Restatement (Second), Torts § 339 (1965)-
"Assumption of risk is applied when the plaintiff has made a voluntary choice
to encounter a known and appreciated danger. White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 9o, 246
N.W. 385 (1933); Robert E. McKee, Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517,
271 S.W.Ad 391 (1954). Halepeska v. Callihan Interest, Inc., supra note 6. After
knowledge and appreciation have been established, "there yet remains the issue
as to whether the invitee voluntarily exposed himself to the danger known and ap-
preciated by him." Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Winder, 340 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). "The voluntary quality of ... [plaintiff's] action ... is encountered immedi-
ately upon consideration of the defense" of assumption of risk. Sewell v. London,
371 S.V.2d 426, 428-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
"Rice, supra note 4, at 335-37.
"Some courts have limited assumption of risk to employment situations. But
these courts apply assumption of risk principles to non-employment situations
under the guise of volend non fit injuria. Such a distinction between assumption
of risk and volenti non fit injuria is one without difference. Surface v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 169 F.2d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 1948); Southern Pac. Co. v. McCready, 47
F.2d 673, 676 (9 th Cir. 1931); Dietz v. Magill, 104 S.W.2d 707, 711 (St. Louis Ct.
App. 1937); Kirby Lumber Corp. v. Murphy, 271 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954); Bailey v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 728, 349 P.2d 1077, 178 (1960).
IlThe three situations referred to in this comment are suggested in Prosser,
Torts § 67 at 450-51 (3d ed. 1964). The Restatement recognizes these three situa-
tions and adds a fourth: when the plaintiff assumes the risk by making a reckless
94 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
assumes the risk when he expressly and validly consents to relieve the
defendant of what would otherwise be a duty of care toward him. In
this situation, since the defendant was relieved of a legal duty to
plaintiff, no tort occurs.16 (2) The plaintiff assumes the risk when he
voluntarily enters into a relationship with the defendant, usually em-
ployment, which will necessarily involve some specific risk. The plain-
tiff's voluntary entrance into the relationship implies his consent to
the defendant's conduct, and again the defendant is relieved of a legal
duty to plaintiff.1 In these two situations assumption of risk is used
as an alternative expression for the proposition that the defendant
was not negligent, i.e., owed no duty to the plaintiff.'5 Used in this
sense, assumption of risk adds nothing to the traditional concepts of
duty and negligence and is merely a term used for identifying a sit-
uation where the defendant has not broken any duty owed to the
plaintiff.19 (3) In the third situation, the defendant has violated his
duty to the plaintiff and will be liable, unless he can establish that
the plaintiff assumed the risk by vohintarily choosing to encounter a
choice to encounter the danger, he is contributorily negligent. Restatement (Sec-
ond), Torts § 49 6A (1964). Situations one and two are often merged and referred to
as the primary sense of assumption of risk, while the third situation is termed the
secondary sense of assumption of risks. James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J.
141 (1952). At least eight states have recognized this dual nature of assumption of
risk, either directly or by inference: California, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, Utah, Vermont, Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218, 1237-41 (1962).
26Prosser, op. cit. supra note 15; Restatement (Second), Torts § 496A (1964);
James, supra note 15.
'171bid.
18"To call this defense [assumption of risk] into play requires a showing
that the person charged has no duty to protect the other from the risk." Dougherty
v. Chas. H. Tompkins Co., 240 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Volenti non fit injuria
"means that the injured party consented to the act or omission which caused his
injury and which without such consent, would be a legal wrong." Wood v. Kane
Boiler Works, Inc., 15o Tex. 191, 238 S.V.2d 172, 174 (Tex. 1951). See Frelich v.
Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 15o A.2d 17 (1959); White v. Mcricker, 216
Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385, 386 (933). Wash v. West Coast Coal Miners, Inc., 31 Wash.
2d 396, 197 P.2d 233, 238 (1948).
'"[A]ssumption of risk serves no useful purpose, since it introduces nothing
that is not fully covered by either the idea of an absence of duty on the part of
the defendant, or by that of contributory negligence of the plaintiff." Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 96 (1959). The Supreme
Court of New Jersey later considered the possiblity of using the phrase assump-
tion of risk to focus attention on the concept of no duty violation by the defendant.
The court rejected the use of the phrase assumption of risk and stated: "Experience,
however, indicates the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mist that it
is better banished from the scene. We hope we have heard the last of it. Henceforth
let us stay with 'negligence and contributory negligence.'" McGrath v. American
Cyanamid Co., supra note 3, at 240-41.
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known danger.2 0 As thus used, assumption of risk is an affirmative
defense and bars the plaintiff's recovery because of his own conduct,
even though the defendant has been clearly negligent; i.e., has violated
his duty to the plaintiff.21 In discussing the confusion between assump-
tion of risk and contributory negligence, the remainder of this com-
ment will use the phrase assumption of risk to mean an affirmative de-
fense, as in this third situation.
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are similar in that
both bar a negligent defendant's liability because of the plaintiff's own
conduct. Assumption of risk bars the plaintiff's recovery when he has
made a voluntary choice to encounter a known danger,22 while con-
tributory negligence bars the plaintiff's recovery because he has acted
unreasonably under the circumstances.23 The similarity between the
two doctrines continues in that the plaintiff has both assumed the
risk and been contributorily negligent when he has made an un-
reasonable, but voluntary choice to encounter a known danger.24
These similarities have led some courts to conclude that assumption
of risk is a form of contributory negligence. 25 The majority of courts
have rejected the proposal that assumption of risk exists only as a part
of contributory negligence, and seek to distinguish the two defenses. 26
Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are sometimes
distinguished on the ground that they are based on different stand-
ards. Assumption of risk is concerned with a subjective standard re-
quiring that the plaintiff have actual knowledge of the danger, where-
as contributory negligence is concerned with an objective standard
requiring only the knowledge of danger that a reasonably prudent man
would have.27 This distinction is helpful only when the assumption
'Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., Vi N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (195o);
McEvoy v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749 (1943); Ewer v.
Johnson, 44 Wash. 2d 746, 270 P.2d 813 (1954).
=Ibid.
2-Cases cited note 12 supra.
OKleppe v. Prawl, x81 Kan. 59 o , 313 P.2d 227 (1957); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
De Atley, i5g Ky. 687, 167 S.W. 933 (1914); Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry. v. State, 244
Wash. 717, 275 P.2d 274 (1954).
"Petrone v. Margolis, 2o N.J. Super. i8o, 89 A.2d 476, 477 (1952); McEvoy v.
City of New York, supra note 2o.
-Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ky., 205 U.S. 1, 12 (1907); Swift and Co. v.
Schuster, 192 F.2d 615 (ioth Cir. 1951); Freedman v. Hurwitz, 116 Conn. 283, 164
At. 647, 649 (1933); Camp v. J.H. Kirkpatrick Co., 250 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
2Cases cited note 4 supra.
"'Surface v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra note 14, at 942; Halepeska v. Callihan
Interests, Inc., supra note 6, at 379; Murdich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31,
go N.E.2d 859, 862 (195o).
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of risk standard is not met. When the assumption of risk requirement
of subjective knowledge is not met, the defense of assumption of risk is
eliminated. 28 and cannot be confused with contributory negligence.
However, when the assumption of risk requirement of subjective or
actual knowledge is met, the contributory negligence requirement of
objective or constructed knowledge is also met, and a further dis-
tinction is necessary to prevent confusion.
The further distinction generally made between assumption of
risk and contributory negligence is that voluntarily cfioosing to en-
counter a known danger may be reasonable, and consequently, not
contributorily negligent. 29 The plaintiff is not contributorily negligent
when his choice to encounter the danger is reasonable, but the plain-
tiff assumes the risk if his reasonable choice was also a voluntary
choice.3 0 Thus assumption of risk is concerned with the voluntariness
of the plaintiff's choice to encounter a known danger, while contribu-
tory negligence is concerned with the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
choice to encounter the danger.3 ' Tle distinction makes it seem that
voluntary choice and reasonable choice are independent of each other,
while in fact they are interdependent.
32
The interdependence of reasonable choice and voluntary choice
"'"Notice or knowledge and appreciation of the danger are indispensable to
the assumption of the risk...." City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 Fed. 321 329 (8th Cir.
19o9); Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 155 Mass 155, 29 N.E. 464 (18gi);
Taylor v. Home Tel. Co., 163 Mich. 458, 128 N.W. 728 (191o). Alexander v. Great
No. Ry., 51 Mont. 565, 154 Pac. 914 (1916).
"Authorities cited note 4 supra.
"Surface v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra note 14; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Hoffman, 57 Ind. App. 431, 1o7 N.E. 315, 318 (1914). "The maxim 'volenti non fit
injuria' means: If one, knowing and comprehending the danger, voluntarily exposes
himself to it, though not negligent in so doing, he is deemed to have assumed the
risk and is precluded from a recovery for an injury resulting therefrom." Landrum
v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82, 84 (1943)- Jay v. Walla Walla College, 53
Wash. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 458, 460 (1959).
"E.g., Weber v. Eaton, 16o F.2d 577, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Shaver v. Manziel,
347 S.V.2d 20, 21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1218, 1231 (1962).
'Foster v. Buckner, 203 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1953); Freedman v. Hurwitz, l6
Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647 (1933); Williams v. Town of Morristown, 32 Tenn. App.
274, 222 S.W.2d 607 (1949). Defendant is liable for a "reasonable" effort to rescue.
Ridley v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 114 Tenn. 727, 86 S.W. 6o6, 6o8 (05). McAfee v.
Travis Gas Corp., 137 Tex. 314, 153 S.V.2d 442, 446 (1941); Bond v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S.E. 932, 933 (iqg8). "[T]he question is not so much
one of the voluntary nature of plaintiff's conduct in encountering the danger as it is
one of feasibility and practicability.... [T]he alternatives which the plaintiff faced at
the time of his... [decision] become important consideration[s] on whether he 'volun-
tarily' encountered the danger or whether there was such coercion as to vitiate the
consent that he manifested." Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting front Open and
Obvious Conditions-Special Issue Submission in Texas, 33 Texas L. Rev. 1, 14
(1954)-
CASE COMMENTS
as an element of assumption of risk 33 is apparent upon examining the
basis courts use in determining whether the plaintiff's choice was vol-
untary. The courts have long recognized that there may be such pres-
sure on the plaintiff as to destroy the voluntariness of his choice, and
consequently his assumption of risk; although the opinions as to
what constitutes sufficient pressure have varied from mere inconven-
ience34 to nothing short of physical constriction. 35 Neither of these
extreme views is followed today, and many courts now hold that there
is sufficient pressure to destroy voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
when the defendant's negligent act has left the plaintiff no reasonable
alternative.36 Thus voluntary choice, as an essential element of as-
sumption of risk, is contingent upon the reasonableness of the alterna-
tives facing the plaintiff at the time of his choice.3 7
Choice, by definition, involves at least two possibilities from which
to choose; consequently, the plaintiff has not made a choice unless
there was an available alternative. Logically, the alternative must be
A voluntary choice to encounter danger is required because assumption of
risk is based on the plaintiff's consent to the injury. Cases cited note 18 supra. The
earliest appearance of assumption of risk was in situations where there was actual
consent by the plaintiff. Rice, supra note 4, at 33o. But even actual consent has
occasionally been criticized as an inadequate reason for denying the defendant's
liability. "There is nothing to be said in the defendant's favor.... If his conduct
alone is considered, there is no reason why he should not bear the cost of com-
pensating the plaintiff." Regardless of the plaintiff's conduct, society has an interest
in deterring the defendant from exposing others to the risks of his created hazard.
Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 La. L. Rev. 17, 44 (1961). Later,
assumption of risk was extended beyond actual consent situations to master-servant
relations where consent was implied from the employment contract. With the ex-
tension of assumption of risk beyond the master-servant situation, the courts stated
that the consent forming the basis of assumption of risk was to be found in the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Wade, The Place of Assump-
ticn of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5, 8 (1961). Just what con-
stitutes a sufficient relationship is uncertain; assumption of risk has been extended
to strangers. Williams v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 464, 98 S.E. 511
(1919).
-"Pomeroy v. Westfield, 154 Mass. 462, 28 N.E. 899 (i8gi). The British view is
that "a man cannot be said to be truly 'willing' unless he is in a position to choose
freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circum-
stances ... but the absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint so that noth-
ing shall interfere with the freedom of his will." Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corp., i
K.B. 476, 479 (1944)-
-RIce, supra note 4, at 22.
"'E.g., Dougherty v. Chas. H. Tompkins Co., 240 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1957);
Thornbury v. Maley, 242 Iowa 70, 45 N.W.2d 576, 581 (1951); Edwards v. Kirk,
227 Iowa 684, 288 N.W. 875, 879 (1939); Pona v. Boulevard Arena, 35 N.J. Super. 148,
i13 A.2d 529, 532, 534 (1955); Rush v. Commercial Realty Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 337, 145
At. 476 (t929). Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. M'cLean, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 130, 118 S.W.
161 (1909).
''A.thorities cited note 31 supra.
1966]
98 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIII
reasonable or unreasonable, and the plaintiff must either choose the
alternative or reject it. Thus when the defendant's negligent conduct
has exposed the plaintiff to a known danger, the plaintiff is faced
with four possibilities: acceptance of a reasonable or unreasonable
alternative to the known danger; rejection of a reasonable or an-
reasonable alternative to the known danger. In the first two possibili-
ties, plaintiff by accepting an alternative to the known danger has
chosen not to encounter the known danger; consequently plaintiff
has not assumed the risk,38 making the reasonableness of the alterna-
tive immaterial. In the third and fourth possibilities, plaintiff, by re-
jecting an alternative, has chosen to encounter the known danger. If
assumption of risk is to be distinguished from the contributory negli-
gence on the ground that the plaintiff may voluntarily, yet reasonably,
choose to encounter a danger,3 9 at least one of these latter two possibili-
ties must constitute voluntary choice (assumption of risk), but not un-
reasonable choice (contributory negligence).
When the defendant's negligence has forced the plaintiff tb choose
between a danger and an unreasonable alternative, the plaintiff's
choice to encounter the danger is not voluntary; thus the plaintiff has
not assumed the risk. An unreasonable alternative is akin to the theory
of duress, i.e., a choice of "your money or your life" is no real choice
at all and negates the voluntariness of the plantiff's choice.40 For-
cing the plaintiff to forego a legal right in order to avoid danger does
not afford him a reasonable alternative. The plaintiff cannot be re-
quired to surrender a valuable legal right, such as the right to use
his land as he sees fit, merely because the defendant's conduct threatens
physical harm if the plaintiff exercises his right.41 Plaintiff in Kelley
had a legal right to go on her own property to attempt a rescue,
thus she did not assume the risk, since it was reasonably necessary to
8Assumption of risk is applicable only when the plaintiff has chosen to en-
counter the danger. Cases cited note 12 supra.
3Authorities cited note 4 supra.
4°Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 155 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 464 (1891);
Mansfield, supra note 32, at 46; Cases cited note 35 supra: "To constitute duress it is
sufficient if the will be constrained by the unlawful presentation of a choice between
comparative evils...." Smith v. United States, 153 F.2d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 1946).
Reiter v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 328 Ill. App. 234, 65 N.E.2d 830, 843 (1946). Z ratberg
v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N.D. 452, 238 NAV. 552, 57o (1931).
"The rights of one man in the use of his property cannot be limited by the
wrongful use by another of his property. Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
232 U.S. 340, 349 (1914). "At least, up to the point where one has become morally
certain that the negligence of another will injure him he may make any proper and
customary use of his property in total disregard of any negligence of that other,
whether such negligence be known to him or not." North Bend Lumber Co. v. City
of Seattle, 116 Wash. 5oo, 199 Pac. 988, 99o (1921).
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encounter the danger in order to exercise that right.42 However, plain-
tiff may have been contributorily negligent if the court deems it un-
reasonable to encounter the known danger to protect the right.4 3
In the fourth possible situation, in which the plaintiff has rejected
a reasonable alternative and has chosen to encounter the danger, the
plaintiff has assumed the risk because the defendant has not created
sufficient pressure, in the form of an unreasonable alternative, to de-
stroy the voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice.4 4 The plaintiff is also
contributorily negligent in rejecting a reasonable alternative because
it is unreasonable to encounter danger voluntarily when there is a
safe alternative.
4 5
Of all the possible situations, only the fourth, in which the plain-
tiff rejected a reasonable alternative and chose to encounter the
danger, constitutes a voluntary choice to assume the risk. This situation
cannot support any distinction between assumption of risk and contrib-
utory negligence because here the plaintiff was also contributorily neg-
ligent in rejecting a reasonable alternative. Thus a voluntary choice
to encounter a known danger, and thereby assume the risk, is equiva-
lent to an unreasonabe choice to encounter the danger; hence, assum-
ing the risk of a known danger is contributory negligence.4 6
It appears that the dissenter in Kelley was correct in his contention
that the plaintiff did not voluntarily choose to assume the risk, since
the plaintiff's only alternative, foregoing her legal right, was unreason-
able and she should, absent contributory negligence, recover. It is sub-
mitted that it would be less confusing to consider these problems under
the rubric of contributory negligence, since the distinction between
'-Dougherty v. Chas. H. Tompkins Co., supra note 18, at 36. O'Nan v. Kroger
Co., 279 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky. 1955). City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W.2d 133,
(Ky. 1952). City of Madisonville v. Poole, 249 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Ky. 1952). Fawbush
v. Carter, 354 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
"3PIaintiff has not assumed the risk when she crosses a slippery floor to buy a
can of beer if "it was necessary to make use of the slippery floor in order to accom-
plish her mission." Plaintiff may be contributorily negligent if it is found to be
unreasonable to encounter the danger of a slippery floor in order to exercise the
right to buy a can of beer. Denham v. Steamer Avalon, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 291, 292
(Ky. 1953). Dougherty v. Tompkins, supra note 18, at 36.
"Cases cited note 36 supra.
'-'It is a "settled rule that where a person, having a choice of two ways, one
of which is safe, while the other is subject to risks and dangers, voluntarily chooses
the dangerous way and is injured, such person is guilty of contributory negligence
and cannot recover." Tharp v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 Pa. 233, 2 A.2d 695, 696
(1938). See Kaczynski v. Pittsburgh, 309 Pa. 211, 163 Atl. 513 (1932); Levitt v.
BIG Sandwich Shops, Inc., 294 Pa. 291, 144 At. 71 (1928).
OSchlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., supra note 25, at 12; McGeever v. O'Bryne,
203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508, 511 (1919); Schleif v. Grigsby, 88 Cal. App. 174, 263 Pac.
255, 258 (1927). Cases cited note 24 supra.
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assumption of risk and contributory negligence-that the plaintiff may
voluntarily, yet reasonably, choose to encounter a known danger-
breaks down when one realizes that it is never reasonable knowing-
ly to encounter a danger when there is a reasonable alternative; and
when there is no reasonable alternative, there cannot by any volun-
tary choice, a fortiori, no assumption of risk.47
RONALD JOSEPH BACIGAL
"This comment has taken an analytical approach to the theories of assumption
of risk and contributory negligehce; it has not considered procedural distinctions of
the two theories. "hese'procedural distinctions can be viewed quickly by noting
Prosser's assertions that: (1) treating assumption of risk as a duty problem would
shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff and would make the issue one for the
judge rather than. the jury; (2) assumption of risk, but not contributory negli-
gence, is a bar to strict liability. Prosser, Torts § 67, at 453 (3d ed. 1964). Prosser
feels in his first assertion that viewing assumption of risk as a question of duty
would be a hardship on the plaintiff. He uses the example where the plaintiff with
full knowledge consented to ride in a defective airplane and was killed- in its
subsequent crash. Because of the plaintiff's death it will be difficult for his survivors
to discover the facts. Prosser points out that under assumption of risk the defendant
has the burden of proving the plaintiff's consent, while under the duty concept the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant's breach of duty. But Prosser's
presentation seems to ignore the fact that under either concept, the plaintiff must
begin his law suit by establishing the defendant's breach of duty to him. Once the
plaintiff has offered evidence of the defendant's breach of duty, the burden of com-
ing forward with evidence shifts to the defendant. The defendant can refute his
liability by offering evidence of the plaintiff's consent. If the theory of assumption
of risk is used, establishing the plaintiff's consent will mean the plaintiff assumed
the risk; if the duty concept is used, establishing the plaintiff's consent will mean
the defendant was relieved of his duty to the plaintiff. Thus Prosser's fear that
using duty rather than assumption of risk concepts would shift the difficulty of
discovering and pleading facts from the defendant to the plaintiff is not borne out.
Under either concept the plaintiff has the burden of discovering and pleading evi-
dence as to the defendant's breach of duty, while the defendant has the burden of
discovering and pleading evidence as to the plaintiff's consent. Using duty rather
than assumption of risk concepts does not transfer the issue from the jury to the
judge. Under either concept the defendant's liability will depend on the question
of plaintiff's consent, which is a fact issue for the jury. The only difference under
the two concepts would be in the judge's instructions to the jury-under assumption
of risk if you find the plaintiff did consent, he assumed the risk and the defendant
is not liable; under duty concepts if you find the plaintiff did consent, the defend-
ant has been relieved of his duty to the plaintiff and the defendant is not liable.
Under Prosser's second assertion contributory negligence is a bar to strict liability if
the contributory negligence is reckless or wanton. When the defendant is strictly
liable for maintaining a wild animal, the plaintiff's conduct in aggravating and teas-
ing the animal would constitute reckless contributory negligence and the defendant
would not he liable. The plaintiff's conscious exposure to such a danger would be on
the same plane as the conduct of the defendant in maintaining the danger. Wade,
The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5, 15
(1961).
